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Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody: The
Aftermath of Griggs and the Death
of Employee Testing *
By JAMmS G. JOHNSON*
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody1 presented the United States Su-
preme Court with two major questions. First, by what standard should
a federal district court determine whether to award or to deny back pay
to those applicants for employment who have been discriminatorily
denied employment or advancement opportunities? Second, what
showing must an employer make to establish that professionally devel-
oped employee selection tests which are not "designed, intended or used
to discriminate," but which have a racially disparate impact, are suffi-
ciently job-related to withstand attack under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 This article will be limited to a discussion of the
latter question and the problems created by the Supreme Court's answer
to it.
The Albemarle decision appears to signal an end to employee
testing because in giving great deference to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures,' the Court effectively mandated strict compliance. The commis-
sion's guidelines, however, are unrealistic and unworkable in practical
application. If these standards are strictly construed and strictly applied
* A.B., 1971, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D., 1974, California
Western School of Law; LL.M., 1975, Georgetown University Law Center; member,
California Bar.
** This article was adapted from a thesis written in partial fulfillment of the
Master of Laws (Labor Law) degree received from the Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). Title VII specifically
forbids employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-manage-
ment committees to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
3. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1975).
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by the courts, employers will be forced to abandon altogether the use of
professionally developed employee testing procedures. In order to
reach acceptable levels of minority representation in his work force, the
employer will be forced to resort to hiring by quota or by some other
arbitrary selection process. The employer will thus avoid the appear-
ance of discrimination and will avoid the risks of attempting to comply
with the guidelines' procedural technicalities. Such a result is contrary
to the congressional intent and the legislative history behind section
703(h) of the act.4  Accordingly, whenever the spirit of Title VII is
followed, strict compliance with the guidelines should be recognized as a
nicety rather than a necessity.
The Guidelines
With the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress gave its stamp of approval to the fundamental concept of
equal employment opportunity. Traditionally, minority workers had
been discriminatorily relegated to lower paying nonskilled jobs, while
better paying skilled jobs were meted out to the White work force.
Through Title VII, Congress sought to enhance the relative social and
economic positions of America's minority populations by making con-
sideration of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin legally irrela-
vant to selection and advancement processes, 5 thereby promoting color
blind employment decisions.
To implement this color blind employee selection policy, Congress
specifically sanctioned the nondiscriminatory use of "professionally de-
veloped ability tests." Section 703(h) of the act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
• . . to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin .. 6
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
5. Section 703 (e) qualifies this statement by specifying that religion, sex, and
national origin are legally irrelevant considerations unless the employer first shows that
"religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... ." Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). Since race
and color were not included within this exception, they are never bona fide occupational
qualifications and are therefore totally irrelevant in the decision to hire, transfer,
promote, or train.
6. Id. § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
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Congress realized, however, that prejudices developed over cen-
turies would not disappear merely with the enactment of Title VII.
Recognizing that discriminatory practices in employment, both inten-
tional and unintentional, would surely continue without an agency to
administer and enforce Title VII, Congress created the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. The commission was granted "authori-
ty from time to time to issue, amend or rescind suitable procedural
regulations to carry out the provisions of [Title VII]." Section
713(a), which vested the commission with this procedural rule making
authority, implicitly limited the commission to adopting rules of proce-
dure and rendering administrative interpretations of the act; it did not
contemplate that the commission's regulations and statements would be
treated as inflexible rules of substantive law and quasi-legislative procla-
mations enlarging Title VII itself. The courts, however, have given the
commission's administrative regulations and legislative interpretations
great weight and have tended to apply them strictly, absent compelling
reasons for doing otherwise.8
On August 1, 1970, the commission published its Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures. 9 These new guidelines were stringent
interpretations of section 703(h), authorizing only employee selection
tests which are related to job performance and which are properly vali-
dated in accordance with specified procedures.1"
The guidelines were issued in response to a significant increase in
the use of tests and a concomitant increase in "doubtful testing practices
which . . . tend[ed] to have discriminatory effects."' '11 The guidelines
reflect the commission's belief that properly validated professionally
developed tests are effective devices which promote the policies of Title
VII and which help develop and maintain an effective work force. The
commission was disturbed, however, that tests were often used "as the
basis for employment decisions without evidence that they [were] valid
predictors of employee job performance."' 2  Thus, the guidelines were
7. Id. § 713(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970). This section further provides
that "[riegulations issued under [it] shall be in conformity with the standards and
limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act." Id.
8. See text accompanying notes 33-64 infra.
9. 29C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1975).
10. The commission stated that because the guidelines are "interpretive in nature,
the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of
proposed rule making, opportunity for public participation, and delay in effective date
are inapplicable." 35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (1970).
11. 29 C.F.RL § 1607.1(b) (1975).
12. Id.
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designed to measure the ability of a particular test to predict perform-
ance on a particular job and thereby to prevent the use of a test which is
fair in form but discriminatory in operation.
Employee selection procedures are not generally scrutinized under
the guidelines unless they are shown to have an adverse impact upon a
protected class. The commission takes the position that whenever a test
screens out minority candidates at a disproportionately higher rate than
nonminority candidates, the test is presumptively discriminatory unless
the employer has fully complied with the guidelines' procedural specifi-
cations.' 3 Compliance with the guidelines requires the employer to
validate the test, to show that it has a "high degree of utility," and to
demonstrate that no available alternative selection procedure has a less
differential impact.' 4
The guidelines require that testing devices be validated by showing
a relation between the devices and actual on-the-job performance. There
is no presumption of validity merely because the test is professionally
developed;' 5 rather, the test must be job-related."8 To be job-related,
the test must measure "important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which the candidates are
being evaluated.' 7  The test is valid to the extent that those who
perform well on it also tend to perform well on the job, and vice versa.
The kind of evidence required, however, is not merely observation of
13. Id. § 1607.3. Since it is the employer who is often intimately concerned with
the legality of his selection procedures and who is the party most often called upon to
substantiate his procedures, this article will refer to him. The arguments advanced,
however, have equal application to all other persons giving or acting upon the results of a
test as defined in the guidelines.
Similarly, since Blacks are generally the minority group most often affected by an
employer's alleged discrimination, and the group most heavily involved in Title VII
litigation, this article will refer to Blacks as the protected class. Nevertheless, the
arguments advanced by this article have equal application to members of other protected
classes.
14. See id. § 1607.3. That section states: "The use of any test which adversely
affects hiring, promotion, transfer or any other employment or membership opportunity
of classes protected by Title VII constitutes discrimination unless: (a) the test has been
validated and evidences a high degree of utility as hereinafter described, and (b) the
person giving or acting upon the results of the particular test can demonstrate that
alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable for his use."
Id. (emphasis added).
15. See id. § 1607.8.
16. Thus, a test which is not properly job-related will not be regarded as "profes-
sionally developed" within the meaning of section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1970).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975).
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the job by the employer or his psychological testing expert, but rather
statistical proof of job-relatedness. The employer, therefore, must con-
duct a careful analysis of a particular job or jobs to determine what
characteristics are necessary for satisfactory performance. On the basis
of that analysis, the employer must select those testing devices which will
objectively measure the extent to which each candidate possesses the
requisite characteristics. The results must then be empirically verified
by using the criterion-related validation technique s if feasible, and if
not, by using either the content validation 9 or the construct validation
method.20
The employer may test candidates for a job at a higher level in the
line of progression than the one for which he is applying. This testing
practice is permitted when it is established that a great majority of the
new employees will probably progress to that higher level2' within a
reasonable period of time. The guidelines provide, however, that
where job progression is not so nearly automatic, or the time span
is such that higher level jobs or employees' potential may be
expected to change in significant ways fthe candidates must be]
evaluated for a job at or near the entry level.22
Furthermore, a test which has been validated in one unit of a multi-unit
organization may be used in another unit without requiring the recompi-
lation of extensive validity evidence whenever "no significant differences
exist between [the] units, jobs, and applicant populations."23
18. Criterion-related validation is an empirical demonstration, using concurrent or
predictive techniques, of the statistical relationship between a test and significant job
behavior. Criterion-related validity is "demonstrated by comparing the test scores with
one or more external variables considered to provide a direct measure of the characteris-
tics or behavior in question." AMEmcAN PSYCHOLOGIcA.L AssociATIoN, STANDARDS FOR
EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGicAL TEsTS AND MANUALS 13 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
APA Standards]. The guidelines specifically endorse generally accepted procedures for
determining criterion-related validity, such as those set out in the APA Standards. See
29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975).
19. Content validation is a subjective comparison between the content of the job
and the test, which incorporates some of the specific tasks necessary for successful
performance. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975).
20. Construct validation establishes the relationship between the physical and/or
mental traits (constructs) found necessary for successful performance and a test which is
designed to measure those qualities. See id. When either content or construct valida-
tion, both generally referred to as rational validation, is used, the validation evidence
"should be accompanied by sufficient information from job analyses to demonstrate the
relevance of the content (in the case of job knowledge or proficiency tests) or the
construct (in the case of trait measures)." Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 1607.4(c)(1).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 1607.4(c)(2).
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Regardless of which job the test is designed to evaluate, the guide-
lines require that empirical evidence be developed to demostrate that:
(1) "the applicant sample used for the validation studies [is]
representative of the normal or typical candidate group for the
job or jobs in question";24
(2) "[the] Tests [are] administered and scored under con-
trolled and standardized conditions";
2
5
(3) "[t]he work behaviors or other criteria of employee ade-
quacy which the test is intended to predict or identify [are]
fully described" ;26
(4) "[the] supervisory rating techniques [are] carefully devel-
oped, and ...closely examined for evidence of bias" ;27
(5) "[if] technically feasible, [the] test [is] validated for each
minority group with which it is used... [so that] any differen-
tial rejection rates that may exist ... [are] relevant to perform-
ance on the jobs in question";
28
The guidelines add that:
(6) "[i]f it is not technically feasible to include minority em-
ployees in validation studies conducted on the present work
force, the conduct of a validation study without minority can-
didates does not relieve any person of his subsequent obliga-
tion for validation when inclusion of minority candidates
becomes technically feasible. 29
In addition to establishing that the test is job-related, the employer
must demonstrate that the test has a high degree of utility. Utility is a
subjective determination that the test is both statistically 0 and practical-
ly31 significant. The concept has been defined as:
an assessment of the importance of a test [determincd] by con-
sidering the number of job vacancies, the proportion of appli-
cants who become satisfactory employees when not selected on
the basis of the test, and the degree of economic and social risk
involved in hiring an unqualified applicant.
32
24. Id. § 1607.5(b)(1).
25. Id. § 1607.5(b) (2).
26. Id. § 1607.5(b)(3).
27. Id. § 1607.5(b)(4).
28. Id. § 1607.4(a); see id. § 1607.5 (b) (5).
29. Id. § 1607.5(b)(1).
30. Id. § 1607.5(c)(1) (significant to at least 95%).
31. Id. § 1607.5(c) (2).
32. Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. Rav. 1109, 1128 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Developments-Employment Discrimination].
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Judicial Response to the Guidelines
The Griggs Decision
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 33 was the first case considering the use
of professionally developed ability tests to select employees. Prior to
July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII, Duke Power Company had
openly discriminated against Blacks by assigning them only to the
lowest paying of the company's five departments. In 1955 the compa-
ny had begun to require a high school education for assignment to any
of the higher paying departments, and on July 2, 1965, it had added the
requirement that all job applicants receive satisfactory scores on two
professionally developed aptitude tests.84 By that time, however, all
lines of job progression had been opened to al qualified applicants
regardless of race.
The company had instituted the tests "on the.. . judgment that
they generally would improve the overall quality of the work force."35
No attempt, however, had been made to validate the tests' relationship to
job performance ability.3 In fact, "[n]either [test] was directed or
intended to measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or
category of jobs.13 7  Nevertheless, both the district court38 and the
Fourth Circuit 9 found no discriminatory purpose in the adoption of the
education and test requirements. Although the requirements had not
been validated and disqualified a substantially disproportionate number
of Blacks, both courts concluded that the employer's subjective intent
should govern. Accordingly, both courts held that there was no viola-
tion of Title VII.4
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. See id. at 426-28. Duke Power's labor department remained open to any
applicant and did not require a high school education or satisfactory scores on both tests.
Those Blacks who had been employed prior to the new requirements, and who thus had
been excluded from the previously all-White, higher paying departments, were eligible for
transfer after completion of high school. In September, 1965, those incumbent employ-
ees who lacked a high school education could qualify for transfer by passing both the
Wonderlic Personnel and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension tests. See id.
35. Id. at 431. The facts strongly suggest that the company imposed the employ-
ment standards for the purpose of limiting the number of Blacks advancing to higher
paying positions. The date the requirements were instituted does not appear to be
merely coincidental. The courts, however, did not appear to consider this fact in
determining the company's intent.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 428.
38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
40. 401 U.S. 429. The court of appeals, however, reversed that part of the district
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In the Supreme Court, the specific question to be resolved was
whether Title VII prohibited an employer
from requiring a high school education or passing of a standarized
general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or
transfer to jobs when (a) neither standard is shown to be
significantly related to successful job performance, (b) both
requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs in question
formerly had been filled only by white employees as part of a
longstanding practice of giving preference to whites. 41
In reversing the court of appeals, the Court found that selection
practices must be job-related to comport with congressional intent.4
Furthermore, the Court found that Congress was more concerned with
the consequences of employment practices than with the motivation
behind them. 43  Thus the Court rejected the claim that requirements
adopted in good faith and without discriminatory intent would satisfy
Title VII's mandate for nondiscrimination, concluding that "good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment proce-
dures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."44
In holding that employment tests must be job-related, the Court
relied on the legislative history of section 703(h).45  Passage of that
section was prompted by the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com-
mission's decision in Myart v. Motorola, Inc.46 The opinion in Myart
suggested that employers were forbidden to use any standardized tests
on which Whites scored higher than Blacks, regardless of whether the
tests were job-related or justified by business necessity. During the
Senate debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the proponents of Title
VII emphasized that it would permit the use of job-related tests.
4 7
Despite these assurances, however, a number of Senators were con-
court's decision which allowed the company to subject incumbent Blacks to the diploma
and testing requirements. The court of appeals also required the company to measure the
seniority rights of those Blacks on a plantwide rather than departmental basis. This
change, the court thought, would eradicate the continuing effects of past discrimination
by giving Blacks employment opportunities equal to those enjoyed by Whites who had
been hired contemporaneously. Id. at 429 n.4.
41. Id. at 427-28.
42. Id. at 432.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
46. 110 CONG. REc. 5662 (1964).
47. See id. at 7246 (remarks of Senator Case); id. at 7247 (remarks of Senators
Clark and Case).
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cerned that the commission might follow Myart and ban all forms of
employment testing having a differential rejection rate for minorities.48
To preclude this result, Senator Tower introduced an amendment which
specifically authorized the use of "professionally developed ability
tests. ' 49 Although initially rejected" because its loose wording ap-
peared to permit the use of any professionally designed test regardless of
its discriminatory effect, 5 the amendment was later modified5 and
passed. 53 Given this history, the Court concluded that the Tower
Amendment, section 703(h), did not preclude the use of testing or
measuring procedures.54 The Court found that: "What Congress has
forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force
unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
... What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure
the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."55
Giving great deference to the commission's guidelines,58 the Court
rejected Duke Power Company's argument that section 703(h) specifi-
cally permitted the use of any professionally developed ability test that
was not intended or used to discriminate. Chief Justice Burger found it
an inescapable conclusion that the guidelines comported with congres-
48. See id. at 13,492; id. at 5614-16 (remarks of Senator Ervin); id. at 5999-6000
(remarks of Senator Smathers); id. at 9025-26 (remarks of Senators Talmadge and
Tower); id. at 9034-35 (remarks of Senators Stennis and Tower); id. at 9600 (remarks
of Senators Fulbright and Ellender).
49. Id. at 13,492. The original Tower amendment provided: "Notwithstanding any
other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to give any professionally developed ability test to any individual seeking
employment or being considered for promotion or transfer, or to act in reliance upon the
results of any such test given to such individual, if-(l) in the case of any individual
who is seeking employment with such employer, such test is designed to determine or
predict whether such individual is suitable or trainable with respect to his employment in
the particular business or enterprise involved, and such test is given to all individuals
seeking similar employment with such employer without regard to the individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, or (2) in the case of any individual who is an
employee of such employer, such test is designed to determine or predict whether such
individual is suitable or trainable with respect to his promotion or transfer within such
business or enterprise, and such test is given to all such employees being considered for
similar promotion or transfer by such employer without regard to the employee's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
50. Id. at 13,505.
51. See 401 U.S. at 435, 436 n.12.
52. 110 CONG. REc. 13,724 (1964).
53. Id. The second Tower amendment was adopted verbatim as section 703(h),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
54. 401 U.S. at 436.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 433-34.
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sional intent 57 insofar as they required that employment tests be job-
related. Thus the commissions' interpretation of the will of Congress,
expressed in the guidelines, merely buttressed the Court's own interpre-
tation, arrived at after an independent review of the legislative history.
Although the opinion states that the guidelines were entitled to
great deference, the Court's endorsement in Griggs was limited to the
commission's construction of section 703(h) as permitting the use of
only job-related tests. Nowhere in the opinion did the Court mandate
strict compliance with all of the guidelines' technical provisions relating
to test validation. Indeed, the decision left open the question of what is
required to validate an employee testing program.
As one commentator noted:
The Supreme Court . . . did not explicitly state the degree of
validity that it would expect of tests having a discriminatory
impact, but its observation that the "touchstone" of permissible
employment practices must always be business necessity indicates
that in all cases psychological standards must be weighed against
business needs.58
Post-Griggs Developments
The judicial response to Griggs generally has been to read into the
decision more than the Supreme Court intended. As has been dis-
cussed, the Court in Griggs held only that Title VII did not allow the
use of a standardized general intelligence test which was not job-related
and which had a discriminatory impact on Blacks. If the Court had
wished to mandate strict compliance with the guidelines' procedures for
establishing the job-relatedness (validity) of a test, it would have done
so in clear and unequivocal language. Nevertheless, by the time the
Supreme Court decided Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,59 several cir-
cuits had endorsed the guidelines in toto, 60 citing Griggs as precedent.
57. Id. at 436.
58. Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on
Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844,
847 (1972).
59. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
60. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. stated that the
"safest validation method is that which conforms with the EEOC Guidelines 'expressing
the will of Congress.'" United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 456
(5th Cir. 1971). Later that year, however, a district court stated that Griggs had made
validity a reasonable, not absolute, requirement. See United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 3 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec. % 8318, at 7073 (N.D. Ga. 1971). In ascertaining the
validity of a test, the commission's guidelines are helpful, the court said, but not binding.
Id. at 7092 n.8. In fact, the court noted, the government offered evidence in the case
that "there was no test known to exist or yet devised which could meet such standards."
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Thus for the lower courts the validity of a test was determined by
whether the employer had strictly complied with the commission's tech-
nical standards.
By unquestioning adherence to the guidelines, the courts have
avoided not only the difficult question of whether a test did in fact
measure one's ability to perform a particular job, but also the perhaps
more critical question of whether the guidelines exceed or conflict with
congressional intent. Although the Court in Griggs stated that the
commission's guidelines are entitled to great weight, that same Court, in
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 1 recognized that when "applica-
tion of [the commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
National Origin]6 2 would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional
intent not to reach the employment practice in question," courts need
not defer to the administrative construction of the statute. 3  Thus it
should also be obvious that if compliance with the commission's guide-
lines relating to employee selection procedures frustrates a clear congres-
sional intent to allow the use of job-related tests, the guidelines should
give way."4 It is unfortunate that the courts have not given this second
question the analysis it deserves.
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody
Facts
Albemarle Paper Company operates a pulp and paper mill in
Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina. Albemarle's operations, characteris-
Id. The Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the district court that Griggs did not require
compliance with every procedure set out in the guidelines, said that the procedures
should nonetheless be followed absent cogent reasons for noncompliance. United States
v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 913 (5th Cir. 1973). The court did recognize,
however, that the guidelines should not be so rigidly applied that they cease to be
guidelines and become absolute mandates. Id. at 915. In other words, the court
acknowledged it is possible to satisfy the job-relatedness standard of Griggs independent-
ly of the guidelines. The first and second circuits have adopted this moderate approach.
Compare Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 400, 403 n.1 (2d Cir.
1973) with Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1973)
and Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 737 (1st Cir. 1972).
The Fifth Circuit, however, has subsequently read Georgia Power as holding that
validation under the guidelines is mandatory. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1974). Both the Sixth and the Eighth Circuits appear
to have adopted this strict compliance rule. See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d
301, 317 (6th Cir. 1975); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th
Cir. 1975).
61. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1975).
63. See 414 U.S. at 94-5.
64. See text accompanying notes 103-116 infra.
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tic of other pulp and paper mills, are organized into functionally distinct
departments, each of which has one or more functionally related lines of
progression consisting of several job categories. The mill has eleven
departments, seventeen lines of progression, and more than one hundred
job categories. Generally, employees enter into each department from a
pool termed the "Extra Board" at the lowest paying and least demand-
ing jobs, and are promoted as vacancies occur according to seniority,
ability, and experience.
In the 1950's the company began to modernize and install the
technologically sophisticated machinery and equipment necessary to
increase efficiency and productive capacity. Owing to this moderniza-
tion, the company developed a strong need for skilled employees. In an
effort to fill this need and to create a pool of employees who had the
potential to progress to the jobs requiring more skill, Albemarle began
to require that all new applicants for skilled lines of progression possess
a high school diploma. Albemarle soon realized, however, that the
education requirement alone did not adequately predict those applicants
who could successfully progress. The company therefore began to use
for this purpose the Revised Beta Examination" and the Bennett Me-
chanical Comprehension Test.6" After conducting a concurrent valida-
tion study, 7 the company concluded that the Beta examination correlat-
ed positively with job performance. In 1963, Albemarle discontinued
the Bennett test in favor of the Wonderlic A and B series tests. 8 Since
that time, any applicant for employment in the skilled lines of progres-
sion has been required to possess a high school education or its equiva-
lent and to achieve a successful score on the Beta and on either the
Wonderlic A or the Wonderlic B examinations.
Prior to the passage of Title VII, Albemarle's lines of progression
were strictly segregated. The higher paying skilled lines were predomi-
nately White, and the lower paying lines were predominately Black.
Until 1968, the company maintained two separate pools of available
employees, one feeding into the skilled lines and another feeding into
65. The Revised Beta Examination is a professionally developed nonverbal test
which measures the intelligence of illiterate and non-English speaking persons.
66. The Bennett Mechanical Comprehension test is a professionally developed test
which measures mechanical ability and verbal skills.
67. A concurrent validation study is a professionally recognized validation tech-
nique which involves the comparison of test scores and job performance data, in this
instance supervisory ratings, on samples of current employees.
68. Wonderlic tests are professionally developed tests designed to measure general
mental ability and reading skills.
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the unskilled lines. In 1968, the two pools merged, but the employees
retained their recall rights to jobs and lines of progression which they
had held prior to entering the pool. The effect of the merger, therefore,
was merely cosmetic, since White employees tended to be recalled to
their "White" jobs and the Black employees to their "Black" jobs. The
company did,, however, attempt to remedSy this situation by giving
temporary transfers into the skilled lines to those employees who did not
meet the test and education requirements, but who appeared from past
experience to be reasonably capable of performing some of the lower-
ranking jobs in the skilled lines of progression.
After Title VII was passed, Albemarle attempted to insure that its
employment practices would comply with the new law. Prior to the
effective date of Title VII, the company began actively to recruit Black
graduates from the local high schools. In addition, it encouraged its
Black high school graduate employees to take the tests in order to make
themselves eligible for transfer into the skilled lines of progression. In
December 1964, Albemarle offered its Black employees working in
several unskilled lines an opportunity to take the examinations, waiving
its education requirement for those who received satisfactory test scores.
A similar offer was made in November 1965, this time to all incumbent
employees. The majority of those Blacks who took the tests, however,
failed to obtain satisfactory scores and thus were not permitted to
transfer into the skilled lines of progression."9
On August 25, 1966, four Black employees filed a class action
against Albemarle, alleging that the company was engaging in racially
discriminatory practices in violation of Title VII.70  The complaint
sought a permanent injunction against those practices and also prayed
for other equitable relief on behalf of the plaintiffs and the class they
claimed to represent.
The case was five years in the pleading and discovery stages before
going to trial. During that time, a body of law under Title VII was
rapidly developing, and it was becoming apparent that seniority systems
and other racially neutral conditions of employment which had the
69. It is unclear from the reported opinions what percentage of Whites similarly
situated took and failed the exams.
70. Prior to filing this action, the plaintiffs had timely filed charges with the
commission alleging racial discrimination and had received a right-to-sue letter. The
plaintiffs' union, Halifax Local No. 425, United Papermakers and Paperworkers AFL-
010, and the international union were named as defendants, but the international union
was dismissed because it had not been named in the charges filed with the commission.
See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
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effect of perpetuating past discrimination could be found violative of
Title VII. 71 Thus, to bring company practices and policies within the
law's requirements, the company and the union negotiated in 1968 a
contract which provided for transfers on the basis of mill, rather than
job, seniority and for the red circling 2 of each transferee's rate of pay.
The most important judicial development in the law of employment
discrimination was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.73 Immediately after the
Supreme Court's decision in Griggs in 1971, Albemarle employed an
expert in the field of industrial psychology and testing to conduct
validation studies of its testing and education requirements. The valida-
tion studies specifically covered ten job groups in eight of the thirteen
lines of progression for which the tests had originally been required,
although it appears that the testing requirements in all lines underwent
the validation process. The rated and tested sample group was selected
from the top and middle of the various lines. Using the generally
accepted concurrent validation technique, the employees' test scores
were compared with job performance ratings assigned them by two
supervisors. 71 The study found statistically significant correlations for
at least one of the three tests in nine of the ten job groups. It also
revealed that the use of the Beta test together with either the Wonderlic
A or the the Wonderlic B test was valid for two of the ten job groups,
and that the use of all three tests was valid for one out of the ten groups.
Based upon these findings, the expert concluded that the tests could be
reasonably used for both hiring and promotion for most of the jobs in
the mill.75
71. See, e.g., United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers Union, 301 F. Supp.
906 (E.D. La. 1969), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516-17 (E.D. Va. 1968).
72. Red circling guarantees an employee transferring to a lower paying job his old
rate of pay until in the new line of progression he catches up to his old rate, or until he
fails to qualify for further promotion within the new line. See Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 4 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 561, 564 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
73. See text accompanying notes 33-58 supra.
74. Neither of the supervisors had access to or knowledge of any employee's test
performance. See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 4 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 561,
567 (E.D.N.C. 1971). The supervisors were asked to rate each employee according to
"just how well the guy can do the job when he's feeling right." See Moody v.
Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1973). The results of the
supervisor's ratings were then averaged to derive each employee's overall job performance
ability. See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 4 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 561, 567
(E.D.N.C. 1971).
75. The expert also attempted to validate the company's education requirement.
Neither a concurrent nor a predictive validation study was feasible, however, because the
present group of employees did not constitute a statistically fair sample and because,
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The Lower Courts
The district court found that "[a]lthough overt racial discrimina-
tion ceased subsequent to the effective date of Title VII, the effects of
this racial discrimination have not been eradicated."7 6  Therefore, the
court reasoned, Albemarle's education and testing requirements had to
be enjoined unless they could be shown to be "necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business. ' 77 The court found, after a personal
trip to the Albemarle mill, that the operation of the complex machinery
"obviously require[d] employees with a high level of native intelligence,
prolonged training and experience. '7 8  Based on this personal observa-
tion and on its finding that the tests had been validated and shown to be
job-related, the court concluded that Albemarle had proved that the
tests were necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. 79
Accordingly, the court held that the tests were permitted by Title VII 3
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, with instruc-
tions on remand to enjoin further application or use of the company's
testing practices."1 Judge Craven, writing for the majority, was con-
cerned that the company had not validated its tests in strict compliance
with the commission's guidelines. In effect, Judge Craven wrote, the
district court had approved a validation study without job analysis,
permitted tests to be used for six lines of progression for which no
validation study had been performed, and allowed requiring a person to
pass two tests for entrance into any of seven lines of progression when
only one of the tests had been validated for those lines.82
given the technological sophistication of the company's processes, it was impracticable to
hire non-high school graduates into the sample. Id. at 568. He therefore designed a
content validation study to measure the verbal skills and aptitude necessary to understand
the written instructions and other material, knowledge of which was required for the safe
and efficient use of the machines and chemicals in the plant. See id. at 568.
76. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 4 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 561, 569
(E.D.N.C. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), affd, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
77. Id. at 570, quoting Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249
(10th Cir. 1970); accord Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.
1971).
78. 4 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 569.
79. Id. at 570.
80. Id. Since the tests adequately measured the skills needed for the job classifica-
tions, the court held that the high school education requirement was unlawful. Id.
81. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), affd, 422 U.S.
405 (1975).
82. Id. at 138, 139. Judge Bryan dissented. He found that the tests had been
properly validated through an equivalent of job analysis, and had been proved job-related.
Id. at 147. He also felt that the company's two-test requirement was justified under the
business necessity rule. He reasoned that the inspection by the district court judge
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The Supreme Court
Albemarle sought Supreme Court review on the question, "[w]heth-
er the District Court's refusal to enjoin Albemarle's use of employment
tests was error as a matter of law? '8 3 In essence, Albemarle was asking
the Court to decide whether the legality of testing must depend upon
rigid compliance with the commission's guidelines.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,"4 reiterated the Court's
unanimous position in Griggs that Title VII declares unlawful the use of
employment tests which prove to be discriminatory in effect unless the
employer meets the burden of showing that its tests or "any given
requirement [has] ... a manifest relation to the employment in ques-
tion."5  The Court stated, however, that even if the employer can
establish the job-relatedness of his testing procedures and selection
practices, he is not immune from attack under Title VII. Under the
commission's guidelines, a complaining party may show that alternative
procedures or practices with a less severe impact are available. Upon
such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to negate the infer-
ence that his tests are being used "merely as a 'pretext' for discrimina-
tion."' 6
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that Albe-
marle's validation efforts were insufficient to meet the requirements of
Title VII as interpreted by the commission. Once again stating that the
guidelines were "entitled to great deference," the Court concluded,
"Measured against the Guidelines, Albemarle's validation study is mate-
rially defective in several respects. '8 7
The Court disagreed with the district court's order partly because it
allowed Albemarle to require tests for those lines of progression for
which the tests had not been validated. The Court recognized that the
guidelines provide that unvalidated tests may be used in such lines, as
long as the tests have been validated in another unit which does not
revealed the high level of intelligence required to operate the plant in a safe and efficient
manner. He also noted that low scores on one or both tests did not automatically bar an
applicant from employment. Id. at 147-48.
83. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3.
84. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
85. Id. at 425, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
This burden arises, the Court noted, only when the plaintiff has presented a prima facie
case by showing that the tests select applicants in a racial pattern significantly different
from that of the applicant pool. Id.
86. See id. The Court in Albemarle, however, was concerned with whether the
tests were properly validated, not with whether suitable alternatives were available.
87. Id. at 431.
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differ significantly in jobs and applicant population. s Viewed in light
of that provision's requirements, the Court found, Albemarle's study
was deficient because it
involved no analysis of the attributes of, or the particular skills
needed in, the studied job groups. There .was] accordingly no
basis for concluding that "no significant differences" exist among
the lines of progression, or among distinct job groupings within the
studied lines of progression. 9
Albemarle's failure to conduct a job analysis sufficient to satisfy the
guidelines further rendered its study invalid. The guidelines require
that an employer develop specific and objective criteria by which super-
visors may make an unbiased evaluation of an employee's job perform-
ance. 0 The Court noted an absence of job analysis in developing the
criteria of job performance by which validity was to be ascertained. Job
performance of Albemarle employees was established by supervisory
ratings, with each employee being evaluated under a vague and subjec-
tive standard which the Court found "fatally open to divergent interpre-
tations." 91  The court of appeals had stated that any correlation of the
test scores with such possibly inaccurate and biased ratings was of
"questionable value."92  The Supreme Court took this argument one
step further, stating that there was "simply no way to determine whether
the criteria actually considered were sufficiently related to the Compa-
ny's legitimate interest in job-specific ability to justify a testing system
with a racially discriminatory impact. '93
The Court also found Albemarle's validation study deficient; while
it focused on job groups at or near the top of the studied lines of
progression, the results of the study were then used to validate the tests
for entry level positions. The Court found that section 1607.4(c) (1) 94
of the guidelines presented a reasonable approach to the problem and
therefore endorsed its application. Accordingly, the Court said that
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (2) (1975).
89. Id. at 432. A related problem, although one not addressed specifically by the
Court, was whether Albemarle could require job applicants to pass two tests for positions
when only one test was validated. The company contended that since it placed all
employees into a pool from which vacancies were filled, it was necessary for all members
of the pool to be qualified to enter any line of progression. The court of appeals had
rejected this argument. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 140 (4th Cir.
1973).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1971).
91. 422 U.S. at 432-33.
92. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1973).
93. 422 U.S. at 433.
94. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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before a test on which employees working at the top of a line of
progression score well can be used to measure the qualifications of new
workers entering lower level jobs, "detailed consideration must be given
to the normal speed of promotion, to the efficacy of on-the-job training
in the scheme of promotion, and to the possible use of testing as a
promotion device, rather than as a screen for entry into low-level
jobs. 95
Finally, the Court further criticized Albemarle's validation study
because it utilized "job-experienced, white workers" and because it
failed to differentially validate the results, at least for the lower-level
jobs."' In these respects the Court found the study insufficient because
it neglected the essential directive of the American Psychological Associ-
ation standards97 and the requirements of sections 1607.5(b) (1) and
(5) of the guidelines.98
Accordingly, the Court found that "the District Court erred in
concluding that Albemarle had proved the job relatedness of its testing
program . . ... " Thus, the Court appeared to be saying that a test
which has not been validated in strict compliance with the guidelines'
technical requirements is not job-related within the meaning of Griggs,
and that its use therefore violates Title VII.
Justice Blackmun, concurring with the result, criticized the majori-
ty's requirement that "absolute compliance with the EEOC Guidelines is
a sine qua non of pre-employment test validation."'10  He cautioned:
We should bear in mind that pre-employment testing, so long as it
is fairly related to the job skills or work characteristics desired,
possesses the potential of being an effective weapon in protecting
equal employment opportunity because it has a unique capacity to
measure all applicants objectively on a standardized basis. I fear
95. 422 U.S. at 434.
96. Id. at 435. The Court admitted that differential validation was most probably
not feasible at this plant because of the years of past discrimination. Id. For a
discussion of differential validation see text accompanying notes 106-09 infra.
97. "The validity of a test should be determined on subjects who are at the age or
in the same educational or vocational situation as the person for whom the test is
recommended in practice." Id., quoting APA Standards, supra note 18, at C5.4. See
29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(1) (1975).
The Court, however, neglected the fact that the tests used by Albemarle were
designed to measure the intelligence of illiterate and non-English speaking applicants,
their general mental ability and their reading skills. Thus job experience per se was not
an important factor in successful performance on the tests administered. In this case,
therefore, the APA Standards should not apply.
98. See text accompanying notes 24, 26-27, 28-29 supra.
99. 422 U.S. at 436.
100. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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that a too rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the
employer little choice, save an impossibly expensive and complex
validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota system of
employment selection. This, of course, is far from the intent of
Title VI.3 01
Shortcomings of the Decision in Albemarle
Employment practices are subject to judicial scrutiny under Title
VII. Perhaps this scrutiny revealed that Albebarle's testing practices
were not ideal. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision, which
apparently mandates strict compliance with the commission's guidelines,
is misguided in several respects. It should be recognized that the
guidelines "are not federal regulations which have been submitted to
public comment and scrutiny as required by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act." 102  Furthermore, the theories underlying the guidelines are
not beyond dispute.10 8 Finally, when strictly applied, the guidelines are
often irrelevant, impossible to follow, and always expensive.
Even when objective tests have been validated under less than ideal
circumstances, they are far superior to more widely used selection
devices such as unstructured interviews or job application reviews. Tests
provide three distinct advantages over less disciplined alternatives: they
are standardized, providing every examinee with the same instructions,
the same tasks to perform, and the same time limits; they are efficient,
enabling the collection of a considerable amount of information about
a person in a short amount of time; and they are amenable to objective
analysis, furnishing test results which may be quantified and subjected
to statistical evaluation.
Strict compliance with the guidelines, however, may force employ-
ers to forego the benefits of testing. In at least three areas, job analysis,
differential validation, and the availability of alternative selection proce-
dures, cases may often arise in which the spirit of Title VII may be
followed without strict compliance with the guidelines.
Job Analysis
The job analysis required by the guidelines °4 serves three purposes
101. Id. Chief Justice Burger stated that "slavish adherence to the EEOC Guidelines
regarding test validation should not be required; those provisions are, as their title
suggests, guides entitled to the same weight as other well-founded testimony by experts in
the field of employment testing." Id. at 452 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
102. Id. at 452 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
103. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3) (1975).
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in a validation study. First, it assists the test developer in selecting the
test or series of tests which might predict job success. Second, it
provides an objective basis for rating and comparing employee perform-
ance on a particular job. Third, it can be used to compare two jobs to
determine whether they involve similar abilities. Job analysis, therefore,
unquestionably has a valid function. Its absence, however, should not
automatically constitute a substantive deficiency in any validation study
provided that other nondiscriminatory means of validation are utilized
and do in fact demonstrate job-relatedness.
For example, when the test has already been selected and the
purpose of the validation study is to determine whether the test signifi-
cantly correlates with job performance, as in Albemarle, job analysis is
an unnecessary exercise. Validation results will not turn upon whether
the employer conducted a detailed job analysis before test selection;
rather, they will depend upon whether the test is demonstrably job-
related.
Moreover, a validation study should not be rendered inadequate
merely because supervisors are not provided a list of specific and
objective criteria by which they are to evaluate employee performance. It
cannot be argued seriously that supervisors are ignorant of the relevant
factors for successful job performance. Therefore, requiring the consid-
erations to be in the form of written job analyses constitutes an elevation
of form over substance. Courts should remember that all evaluations
are subjective by nature, regardless of the criteria utilized; 1 5 they often
require the controlled use of human judgment, from which subjective
considerations cannot be divorced.
As mentioned above, job analysis facilitates the comparison be-
tween two jobs. Again, however, it is unnecessary to require that the
analysis be written. A testing expert familiar with the plant or the
industry may have sufficient knowledge of the relevant job criteria to
analyze two jobs informally, without preparing written job analyses, and
to reach a professionally sound conclusion that no significant differences
exist between them. If challenged, of course, the expert would have to
substantiate his conclusions. The mere absence of written analyses,
however, should not automatically cause rejection of an otherwise valid
study.
105. Objective measures of an employee's performance do not always exist. There-
fore the supervisor's subjective evaluation often comes into play. In all likelihood, the
supervisor's impression of the employee's overall performance will influence each sepa-
rate rating. This result is the so-called halo effect. Thus, any attempted quantification
of these ratings will merely pay lip service to the requirement of objectivity.
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Differential Validation
The term "differential validity" is defined as "the notion that tests
can be valid for one race but not for another, or that a lower score for
one race may be equally as predictive of job success as a higher score is
for another."'106 This concept has come under heavy attack in recent
years and is generally regarded by psychologists as empirically un-
sound. 10 7 Although differential validation is highly suspect, the guide-
lines require that the employer generate data for each minority group to
which the test is administered and validate the test for each such
group. 1
08
The requirement that tests be differentially validated may enjoy
emotional support when a minority employee who did not meet the
entry level test qualifications later proves to be a satisfactory worker. It
must be remembered, however, that all predictive processes rely on
probability theory. Specific instances of deviation from the predicted
result are inherent in the concept of probability. Any validation study
merely ensures that the selection device chooses a successful employee
with significantly greater frequency than could be expected from pure
chance. There will always be exceptions, namely high scorers who
become poor employees and low scorers who become good employees.
Nonetheless, to allow these exceptions to dictate the rule by requiring
that the only approved tests are those which have been differentially
validated may be to reject needlessly the benefits of employee testing. 109
Requiring differential validation in every case fails to recognize the
enormous expense involved in validating tests and the impracticability of
validating tests for several groups unless each is sufficiently large to be
statistically significant. Thus, unless there is demonstrable evidence
106. Developments-Equal Employment, supra note 32, at 1129.
107. A six-year study conducted by the Educational Testing Service of Princeton,
New Jersey, in cooperation with the Civil Service Commission found that carefully
administered preemployment tests can accurately gauge the ability of prospective employ-
ees. The study concluded that "persons who do poorly on job-related tests, regardless of
race, don't do well at work either." J.T. CAMPBELL, L.A. CROOK, M.H. MAHONEY &
D.A. RocK, AN INVESTIGATION OF SOURCES OF BIAs N TEM PREDICrION OF JOn
PERFORMANCE: A Six-YEAR STUmY (1973). See Barrett, Grey Areas in Black and White
Testing, 46 HARv. Bus. Rnv. 92, 94 (1968); Boehm, Negro-White Differences in Validity
of Employment and Training Selection Procedures: Summary of Research Evidence, 56
I. A'P. PsycH. 33 (1972); Gael & Grant, Employment Test Validation for Minority and
Non-Minority Telephone Company Service Representatives, 56 J. App. PscH. 135
(1972).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1975).
109. Brief for American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae at
12-13, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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that a test is differentially invalid, failure to validate a test for each
minority group should not render a study inadequate.
Availability of Alternative Selection Procedures
Once a test has been proved to be job-related, the employer has
met his burden of proof under Griggs. The guidelines, however, im-
pose two additional requirements before an otherwise valid test may be
utilized in the employee selection process. First, the guidelines require
that the test demonstrate a "high degree of utility." 110 This requirement
adds nothing. A test's utility lies in its ability to predict significantly
which candidates will successfully perform their job functions. There-
fore, a test which has been validated is, by definition, useful. By listing
several factors which should be considered in assessing the test's useful-
ness,"' the guidelines do little to further Title VIl's objectives. The
utility requirement further complicates the validation process, and it
very likely discourages employers from utilizing a most effective, objec-
tive tool for employee selection: valid, professionally developed tests.
The second, and more serious, obstacle to the use of tests is the
requirement that the employer demonstrate the unavailability of alterna-
tive suitable selection procedures which would have a less adverse
impact upon Blacks." 2 Reflection reveals that this requirement impos-
es the impossible burden of proving a negative. How can an employer
prove that an alternative suitable selection procedure does not exist? At
what point has he exhausted all possible alternatives?
The unavailability requirement is entirely unrealistic. The em-
ployer is hampered by very real constraints, primarily his limited finan-
cial resources. Yet the number of alternative procedures is virtually
unlimited. Certainly, an employer may under some circumstances have
to abandon the use of a validated test. Nevertheless, in the absence of a
readily identifiable and clearly applicable alternative selection technique
of equal validity which is proved to have a significantly less adverse
effect on minorities than the technique used by the employer, it would
seem more reasonable to permit the employer to continue to use a
validated test without requiring him continually to explore the validity of
other selection devices. To impose more stringent requirements would
force the employer to abandon employment tests altogether.
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(a) (1975).
111. Id. § 1607.5(c).
112. Id. § 1607.3(b). Even if it is established that some alternative selection
procedure exists, it is not clear whether such a finding merely subjects the invalid testing
procedure to injunctive remedy, or also subjects the employer to the economically
disastrous back pay provisions of Title VII.
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Validated employment tests are obviously valuable tools to the
employer. They aid in selecting employees who are qualified to func-
tion well on a given job; they "[clothe] employment decisions with
objectivity, [give] comfort to the employer who feels he now has the
most qualified employee, and [protect] him from charges of nepotism
or discrimination." 113 Testing is therefore an attractive, efficient, and
economical means by which the employer can develop a productive
work force while at the same time discharging his obligations under
Title VII. It is an economic fact of life, however, that validation costs
vary directly with the amount of highly complex, and sometimes futile,
research required. Even if significantly predictive of performance, the
more expensive testing becomes, the more likely it is that the employer
will forego the use of professionally developed tests and will resort to
employee selection based upon quotas rather than qualifications. Thus,
to remain an economically viable and attractive option to the employer,
validation should require no more than that which is reasonably neces-
sary to demonstrate that the test predicts satisfactory job performance.
If strictly enforced, the guidelines go beyond the standard estab-
lished in Griggs that the test should reasonably predict job success. In
Albemarle, the Supreme Court failed to recognize that the commission's
validation procedures are merely theoretical ideals, or standards of
perfection. They are not intended to be rigidly applied once a test is
shown to be significantly job-related, since the over-validation which
would result would raise the cost of testing beyond tolerable limits for
most employers. The American Psychological Association recognizes
that a set of standards cannot cover every situation, and that therefore its
standards, which are endorsed by the commission,"' should not be
inflexibly applied. The association's standards are
a set of standards to be used in part for self-evaluation by test
developers and test users. An evaluation of their competence
does not rest on the literal satisfaction of every relevant provision
of this document. . . . Instead, an evaluation of competence
depends on the degree to which the intent of this document has
been satisfied by the test developer or user."15
Conclusion
Courts must recognize that the art of psychological testing is
imprecise. It is based upon the exercise of professional judgment, even
113. Developments-Equal Employment, supra note 32, at 1120-21.
114. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975).
115. APA Standards, supra note 18, at 6, 8.
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though couched in empirical methodology. Testing depends on the
industrial psychologist, not for his ability to correlate empirical data, but
rather for his ability to adapt generally accepted procedures to a particu-
lar situation. In determining whether a validation study has provided a
sufficient demonstration of a test's job-relatedness, therefore, the com-
mission and the courts should allow variations in method "so long as the
study under review does not disregard or clearly misapply professionally
recognized standards and principles." 116 Despite the adoption of this
enlightened approach by some groups, however, present practice has
been to disallow variations in validation methodology.
Given the problems the guidelines may pose, the employer has
good reason to insure that his selection processes do not trigger the
guidelines' application. Naturally, the easiest way to avoid exhaustive
validation techniques is to avoid a demonstrably adverse impact upon
Blacks. Thus, the employer is encouraged to lower the cutoff test score
and other applicable job qualifications for Black applicants so that their
representation in his work force approximates the percentage of Blacks
available in the relevant labor pool. In this way, the employer's hiring
policies will appear, at least, to comply with Title VII.
Hiring by quotas, however, offends the basic precepts of Title VII.
Congress intended that employment decisions be based upon color
blind qualifications, not quotas." 7 Unfortunately, the apparent effect
of the Supreme Court's decision in Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody
is to nullify congressional intent in favor of the Court's own intent. It is
hoped that the Court will reappraise its position and uphold the validity
of employment tests which follow the spirit of Title VII, even though
they may fail to comply with some of the requirements found in the
guidelines. Until that time, however, Albemarle poses a serious threat
to equal employment opportunity and, perhaps misguidedly, signals an
end to meaningful employment testing.
116. Brief for American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae at
17, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
117. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970); 110
CONG. Rac. 6563-64 (1964) (remarks of Senator Kuchel); id. at 6549, 12,723 (remarks
of Senator Humphrey); id. at 7217 (remarks of Senators Clark and Case).
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